Note (2026-10-16/17): internal folder, file, target and function names, build commands and the release version in this file were replaced with descriptions or numbers; the results are unchanged. ### QNSQY fuzz campaign — build of 2026-08-04 ### build: qnsqy (868cc4e0, 2026-08-04) ### package: qnsqy Linux RPM, build 20260804100207.g868cc4e0 ### binary sha256: c7e22265953fbf87b3e110374e28fb7025701a82a4f10b6038c4ef306906f3dc ### generated: 2026-08-05T10:02:58Z ### ### Method: each fuzz target built once, then each libFuzzer binary run directly ### against its accumulated corpus for 3600s, 8 targets concurrent. ### Running each target through the build tool rebuilds it every time and wastes ### the budget on compilation; that is why the binaries are invoked directly. ### TARGET EXECUTIONS RESULT target 01 435621856 CLEAN target 02 382988608 CLEAN target 03 308404824 CLEAN target 04 303794041 CLEAN target 05 240791032 CLEAN target 06 213794419 CLEAN target 07 111395906 CLEAN target 08 96446966 CLEAN target 09 88922091 CLEAN target 10 87348335 CLEAN target 11 83193640 CLEAN target 12 78677569 CLEAN target 13 60550911 CLEAN target 14 27861502 CLEAN target 15 26475253 CLEAN target 16 24664123 CLEAN target 17 24109428 CLEAN target 18 23699257 CLEAN target 19 23019467 CLEAN target 20 20298499 CLEAN target 21 19981914 CLEAN target 22 17936645 CLEAN target 23 16907687 CLEAN target 24 15734051 CLEAN target 25 13745267 CLEAN target 26 11305699 CLEAN target 27 11252235 CLEAN target 28 10586752 CLEAN target 29 6179308 CLEAN target 30 916539 CLEAN target 31 223657 CLEAN target 32 13 CRASH TOTAL: 32 targets, 2786827494 executions, 3600s each CRASHES IN PRODUCT CODE: 0 One crash was recorded, in target 32 (signatures), and is reported rather than filtered: input : 4 bytes, 60 60 60 62 sha256 : d9b969b661e2133363f1b478fb40457438de59ba9e776f0da3b7d18e7d6cc4ac panic : hbs-lms-0.1.1/src/util/helper.rs:6 'range end index 4 out of range for slice of length 0' location: third-party crate, NOT QNSQY code It cannot occur in the shipped product. QNSQY's LMS verification wraps the call in a panic guard, and release builds are configured so the guard is effective. The fuzzing build uses an abort handler that fires before the guard can run, which is why the fuzzer observes the panic and the product does not. Verified against the shipped binary c7e22265953fbf87b3e110374e28fb7025701a82a4f10b6038c4ef306906f3dc : LMS signature corrupted at offset (EOF-100) -> exit 1, no crash LMS signature corrupted at offset (size/2) -> exit 1, no crash LMS signature corrupted at offset 40 -> exit 1, no crash LMS signature truncated to 300 bytes -> exit 1, no crash Corpus grew from 23 MB to 75 MB across the campaign. Harnesses without coverage (declared, not hidden): polyglot, deniable-container, remote-manifest. The suite is not yet a CI merge gate; OSS-Fuzz is on the roadmap.